Washington's headquarters were about a quarter of a mile north of the inner line, at a country-seat then belonging to Colonel Roger Morris, and now known as the "Jumel House." The British army at this time lay in an encampment which stretched across the island, with its right resting upon the East River near Horen's Hook, and its left extending to the Hudson, a little south of Macgowan's Pass, being protected by vessels of war upon either flank. Harlem Plains extended between the hostile camps. Before the end of September, Washington's fortifications had become so formidable, that the Commander-in-chief of the Royal army would not run the hazard of attempting their reduction by assault. Thenceforward, the thoughts of the latter were bent upon getting in the rear of his adversary by an invasion of Westchester. The supplies of the American camp came principally from the counties along the Hudson and from New England, and General Howe thought with reason, that Washington, when his communications with the country toward the north and east should once be cut off, would either be compelled to surrender at discretion, or to

Chapter I

BEFORE THE BATTLE OF WHITE PLAINS 3

fight under all disadvantages. The policy of the two generals was exactly antagonistic. Howe was at the head of a regular army, which was not only in the highest state of discipline and equipment; but flushed with the victory of Long Island; he was therefore desirous of terminating the war by a pitched battle in the open field. Washington's forces were for the most part patriotic, but untrained militiamen or volunteers, capable of fighting well under cover, but unskilled in military evolutions and disheartened from recent defeat. He was de-termined therefore to act upon the defensive, and to avoid a general action, unless he should be well intrenched upon strong ground.