BATTLE OF WHITEPLAINS, ETC. 61 and were often without bayonets. So great was the deficiency of these latter weapons, that some of the men were furnished with pikes hastily and roughly manufactured, for the purpose of resisting the British cavalry. The want of bayonets was one reason why upon Chatterton Hill, the levies and militia fled before the Seventeenth light dragoons. Washington seems to have had no mounted force at White-plains with the exception of a small corps of light dragoons. These horsemen were from Connecticut, and conducted them-selves so well, that they drew from the Commander-in-chief an unqualified tribute of praise in the general orders from the 1st of November. "A relief," say the orders, "having come from the Light Horse under Major Backus, that corps is now dismissed, with the General's hearty thanks for their faithful services, and the cheerfulness and alacrity they have shown upon all occasions." General Washington's strategy in Westchester during the campaign of 1776 has generally been highly estimated by military writers. Nearly destitute of cavalry, he made the most skilful use of infantry and artillery under his com-mand; which in the aggregate never exceeded eighteen or nineteen thousand men, in general badly equipped. To a very great extent, they consisted of peaceable husbandmen, fresh from their firesides, and never before in the presence of an enemy. The British army on the other hand, although numerically smaller, was beyond all comparison the more effective. It consisted of at least fourteen thousand men, in the highest state of health, discipline and equipment; in-cluding two regiments of light dragoons. Where he could, the American commander-in-chief placed his irregulars under cover of intrenchments; in which position he knew they would behave well. At Chatterton Hill, however, most of them re-mained firm under a long continued cannonade, although the second shot struck down one of their number, and their sub-sequent losses were serious.