But regardless of censure or disapprobation he called into the field large bodies of militia, and organized a corps of new fencibles for the protection of the city of New York, consisting of one thousand men. In Sej)tember, 1814, the militia in service for the defence of the city amounted to 17,500 men. He was even ready to dispatch a force imder the lamented Decatur for the assistance of Baltimore, which was then menaced with an attack, and iiad not the news of the enemy's retreat been received the succor would have been upon the march to the relief of a sister state. In 1814, from information received and corroborated by the movements of the enemy, there are suS- cient grounds of belief that one great object of Iiis campaign was to penetrate with his northern army by the waters of Lake Cliamplain and the Hudson, and by a simultaneous attack with his maritime forces on New York, to form a junction which would sever the communication of the states. The exigency of the time, while it subjected the executive to great responsibility,

120 HISTORY OF THE

admitted of no delay. To defeat his arrogant design and save the state from inroad, it was necessary immediately to exercise fuller powers and more ample resources than had been placed in his hands by the legislature. He proceeded therefore to make such dispositions as were deemed indispensable to secure the exposed points against menaced invasion. To effect these objects he found it necessary to transcend the authority and means vested in him by law, perfectly satisfied that the legislature would approve and sanction what he had done.