As far as our knowledge of it extends, history is wholly silent, concerning the influences which controlled General Washington and concerning the objects which he had in view, when he determined to occui)y Chatterton's-hill, with so large a projjortion of his already feeble and uncertain Army, including three of the best, if not the best three, of his Regiments;" and, especially, at a later hour, when, at a critical moment and in the face of an overwhelming enemy, he determined, also, to strengthen the force whom he had already sent, and to hold the position, at all hazards, sending, for those purposes, another very strong detachment of those troops in whom he reposed his greatest confidence, as soldiers, and whom he could ill-spare from the insutHciently manned lines which he, himself, was then occupying.

At best, Chatterton's-hill, at that time, was an isolated position ; beyond the American lines ; too distant to be supported from the main body, in the presence of an enemy occupying the Plains, unless in force and at great risk ; with no line of communication with the main body, which was not commanded by the enemy; and with no opening for a retreat of the occupying force, in case of a disaster, unless to the westward, into the neighboring hills of Greenburgh, which were already occupied by the fugitive New Englanders whom General Spencer had attempted to command. It could hardly be considered, therefore, with any degree of propriety, as anything else than a detached and indei)endent position, formmisHioned and Xon-evnuuisKioned ({[Heerf, Rank and File, Kdled, Wuuuded, and MinrtuKj, etc., appendeil to his despatch to Lord George Germaine, ilated "New-York, 3 December, 1776." We have compared it with the Return of the Killed and Wounded of the Second Brigade, etc., made \>\ General Leslie ; and find tliat, although the details of the cla.ssifications differ, the aggregate of the British loss is the same -- one hundred and fifty-seven Officers and Men.