We have no means for ascertaining their exact losses, on the twenty-eighth of October.

11 We are not insensible tliat Stedman, in his History of the American War, (i., 214,) said "the reason of their " [the Americans,] "occupying " this posture," [on Chatterton's-hill,] " is inexplicable, unless it be that " they could not be contained within the works of their Camp;" but the reason assigned was too evidently ridiculous to be regarded with the slightest respect.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774-1783.

iiig no portion of the Aiiu'rioau lines ; and nothing else thiui a supposition, on the part of (roneral Washington's advisers anil on that of the (Jeneral himself, thai the continued ()eeu[)alion of it was absolutely essential to the safety of the main body, in the position whieh it then occupied, could possibly have led him to make such a costly and hazardous experiment, under tiie existing circumstances and in the iramediati presence of such an overwhelming enemy, as the continued occupation and defence of Chatterton's-hill. But (reneral Washington had evidently planned better than he knew ; and, in the proviilence of (Jod, sonic results which were more beneficial to the Americans than any which he had conceived and ho[)ed for, were niupiestionably derived from thai seemingly unpromising experiment of occupying and holding tiiat exceedingly exposed position, on the western bank of the Bronx; among which result-*, in America, we may mention the effect of that occupation, as an apparent menace against the left Hank and rear of the Royal Army, in whatever movement that Army, under (Jeneral Howe, should make against the American lines; tlie delay in that evidently projected movement of the Royal Army, to enable its commanding (xcneral to remove what ajtpeared to have been a dangerous element from Chatterton's-hill -- a delay whieh enabled the Americans to strengthen their defensive works and to become better prep.ared for defending them, whenever the Royal Army should move against them ; -- and the reduction of that great Army, which was, then, in front of the American lines, and ready to move against them, for the purpose of assaulting the Americans who had occupied the hill as well for that of holding the hill, subsequently, which reduction of the strength of his main body compelled General Howe to wait for the arrival of reinforcements, to abandon his intention to assault the works which sheltered the main body of the American Army, and, finally, to retire from Westchester-county -- the firstmentioned of which consequences aflbrding still further time and opportunities to General Washington and his feeble command : the latter two afibrding to the Americans, everywhere, the tclat, as well as some of the advantages, of better generalship and of consequent success.