The escape of Washington to New been obliged to have would he and off, cut been have then would oi waging a retreal into New England, with the single alternative bout northern round-a a by ing proceed or there war local defensive route to the middle colonies, where also he would have been under the disability of local confinement, with his lines of eastern communication closed by the Hudson. General Howe's calculations were not, however, so far-reaching; he was engrossed with the immediate business of annihilating the patriot army. He probably felt that the diversion of so large a force as would be necessary to hold the Westchester bank of the Hudson would be an unprofitable division GENERAL of his strength at the time, and he did not care to risk the losses likely to result in passing numerous warships and transports around the cheuaiuc <le frisc under the guns of Fori Washington and Lee. The final decision of Howe to move on General Washington from the Sound without preliminarily closing the Hudson against him as far north as the Highlands was indeed a reversal of what was expected by the best American opinion. Not that it was seriously supposed Howe's main attack would proceed from the river side of Westchester County. It was not doubted that when he got ready to act he would choose some point on .he Sound for his outflanking movement, since that const was wholly unprotected by American forts or improvised impediments to navigation, and from its low formation afforded perfectly satisfactory conditions for landing, which nowhere existed on the precipitous shores of the Hudson. But there to conwas an apprehension on the American side which inamounted force he would viction that before making his next movement secure the navigation of the Hudson;