As late as the 11th of October (the very day before Howe's complete disclosure of his project) Colonel Tilghman, writing to the committee of Hie State convention from the American cam]), with full knowledge of such informal ion as Washington himself possessed, made this peculiarly malapropos statement: "We have no intel igence of any troops, either horse or foot, going round Long Island into°thc Sound." Thus up to the last moment Washington was not apparently reonly quite unsuspicious of the impending blow, butfrom the Sound garded the possibility of a movement against him as a still remote eventuality, to be considered for the time only in relation to the rumored departure of an expedition around Long Island (that is, around the eastern extremity of the island ami thence through the Sound). Well may it be believed, as several historical writers aver, that the intelligence brought to Washington on the morning of October 12 that the whole British army was sailing up the East River and disembarking on Throgg's Neck, completely sur-

MILITARY

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177<).

HISTORY

WESTCHESTER

COUNTY

prised him. We are told by Dawson that he " appears to have given way to despair in view of his powerlessness, and to have become despondent," and that the record of Ins official acts for the day is remarkable chiefly for singular lack of the active proceedings naturally to have been expected from the commander-in-chief in such an emergency. It is true that, contrasted with the conditions which would have obtained if Howe had been in possession of the Hudson simultaneously with opening his campaign from the Sound, the situation created by his sudden descent on Throgg's Neck was not without an element of hope. At least, one flank of the American army remained quite unimperiled, which afforded scope for thwarting the designs of the enemy upon the other by the resources of defensive generalship.