But even granting the force of the special objection to Pelham Neck as an original landing place, one marvels why Throgg's Neck should have been regarded as the only alternative spot. Surely there was adequate depth of water at points farther up the Sound (Mamaroneck Harbor, for instance); and General Howe's sole object being to outflank Washington, it would have been rather an advantage than a disadvantage for him to disembark at a comparatively northernly locality. In whatever aspect the Throgg's Neck landing is viewed, it is hard for the dispassionate mind to regard it otherwise than as a prodigious strategic blunder.1 During the six days of Howe's supine occupation of Throgg's Neck, Washington's headquarters were continued at Harlem Heights, where also, in conjunction with the Kingsbridge dependency, the 1 A glance at the map shows that Throgg's Neck, in a purely geographical sense (not taking into account either its practical insular character or the fact, which must have been known to Howe, that the adjacent country was well guarded by the Americans and its roads had largely been rendered impassable), was about the most unfavorable place that could have been hit upon for initiating a movement to set the royal army down in Washington's rear. It is, indeed, on a due-east line, somewhat south of the Heights of Harlem and Kingsbridge: so that upon Howe's arrival at Throgg's Neck Washington was actually in advance of him along the one open line of movement. The complacency of Washington in renminbis in his Harlem Heights and Kingsbridge position until after Howe had pushed northward to Pell's Neck, although six days had elapsed meanwhile, is of itself plain demonstration that Howe blundered egregionsly in his choice of ground so far as his intention of outflanking the patriot general was concerned. The civilian Duer, of t lie State convention, in his correspondence with Washington's headquarters, shows a perfect grasp of the elements of the situation.