The remarkable forbearance of the British general was duo, as he subsequently explained, to his settled policy "not wantonly to commit His Majesty's troops where the object was inadequate." He abhorred skirmishes, and he despised such a merely partial issue as the capture of ;i portion of Washington's forces or even the shattering of the whole -- for his cautious mind saw only the minimum advantage to be derived by disturbing the movement after its van |,;, <l passed him, and refused to believe thai Hie entire object of his campaign would follow, lie was looking for a grand finale, a pitched buttle with thousands engaged, to terminate in the rebel general's ible appearance before him and his glittering staff to deliver over his sword and surrender the hist bleeding remnant of his host. Even in his short advance from above New Bochelle to Scarsdale, on the 25th and 20th, it is said thai he moved •• with the utmost circumspection, not to expose any pari which inighl be vulnerable," alt! gh there was no foe to the oust of him, and at the north Washington's main bod} was occupied in building its White Plains inirenehiiients, and .it the west, over across the Bronx Kiver, he could see, almost without the aid of his field-glasses, the troops of General Lee most painfully and tediously toiling on, rather in the character of boasts of burden than of armed men. Hut the capital blunder of Howe was his lazy movement in muss. According to his definition of his object, it was to make a master stroke which would end the war. This he might have attempted by assailing Washington in his intrenchments on Harlem Heights, which would have been foolhardy because of the strength of the position. His whole purpose in coming up to Westchester County was to surround thai position from the north, and, by thus cutting off Washington's communications and supplies, force him either to surrender or to offer battle in the open field.