A feature of the fighting at the left of the line was the spirited defense of a portion of the position, against a force twice as strong as his own, by Captain William Hull (afterward General Hull, distinguished in the War of 1812), who commanded a company of the Connecticut regiment. It has already been mentioned that a slight intreiichment was thrown up (or rather begun) on Chatterton's Hill during the night of October 27 by Brooks's Massachusetts militiamen. But this elementary work did not prove of the least utility to the defenders of the hill. The action on Chatterton's Hill was not fought by the Americans from behind intrenchments like Bunker's Hill, but on ground fully exposed to the onrush of the enemy-- or at least affording only the incidental protection of a sheltering rock here and there and a straggling stone fence or two. Before the charge of troops outnumbering them by three or four to one-- troops as skilled and hardened in the business of war as any that the armed camps of Europe could supply, and operating under the gaze of their commander and the whole army -- it was humanly impossible to hold such a position. Everything reasonably possible was performed by all concerned -- if we except the single regiment of undisciplined militia: the position at every point was nobly defended, and in several instances with signal brilliancy; the retreat, when nothing but retreat remained, was performed with dignity as well as discretion and without material loss; and finally the punishment visited upon the foe was much more considerable than that inflicted by him. Regarding the losses on both sides we accept Dawson's figures, which appear to have been compiled with exactitude. The British regiments lost 35 killed, 120 wounded, and 2 missing, a total of 157; the mercenary regiments 12 killed, C>2 wounded, and 2 missing, a total of 76 -- making a grand total on the enemy's side of 233.