In order to make a formidable campaign on New York City -- which could proceed only by way of Kingsbridge, a point not to be reached except by a long march down the Westchester County peninsula, and not to be deliberately assailed without the previous concentration of all of Washington's forces -- the Americans would have had to lay bare their SIR HENRY CLINTON. intentions weeks in advance. How different the situation at Peekskill ! It could always be surprised by a river expedition from New York City, with but the briefest possible foreknowledge on Washington's part. It was a point of supreme importance, but only one among several. He therefore had to distribute his forces, uncertain where the enemy's next blow would fall, but at all times convinced that he would seek sooner or later to push up the Hudson River. The safety of the Hudson was Washington's greatest concern, and with the beginning of each campaign he suffered torments on that subject. There was an incessant marching and countermarching of troops to and from Peekskill, and Washington himself, except when during his campaign in Pennsylvania, in the southern part of New Jersey, and finally in Virginia, was never more than a few days' march distant from the place. Indeed,

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in several of his main movements preliminarily to the unfolding of the enemy's principal project for the impending campaign, he made it the cardinal point of his programme to take a central station from which he could with equal convenience march to Peekskill or to other threatened points according to ultimate circumstances. To the vigilance with which he watched the Hudson, his carefulness in fortifying it, and his promptitude in counteracting British attempts upon it, the final success of the devolution was unquestionably due as much as to any single factor.