Washington, on the other hand, deemed a New York campaign of first and supremest importance -- not because he considered American interests less needful of his personal employment in the South than in the North, but for the precisely contrary reason that the proposed move against New York was the one essential instrumentality by which to relieve the stress at the South. At Weathersfield he urged this opinion with the utmost confidence, and all his subsequent procedure corresponded with his original conviction. There is nothing to show that at any time he cherished undue hope of actually capturing New York -- especially in the absence of re-enforcements and of assurance that the fleet would co-operate. But he was for an immediate and perfectly formal New York campaign, let the fleet come where it might. Perhaps he seriously hoped to take New York. But the eventuality there did not interest him so much as the manifest advantage of the strategy. He would make so formidable a demonstration against New York that Sir Henry Clinton would either have to lose the city or leave Cornwallis at the South to his own resources. In either case there would be an excellent chance to strike the final blow. W this was not Washington's exact mental attitude from start to finish -- clearly formulated at the beginning and never modified by special conditions later -- then his whole course of conduct and expression was purely accidental, a thing not to be believed of him. Again and again he was besought to leave the army at the North and take the command in Virginia; and uniformly he replied that he was resolved to continue at the North conformably with well-matured