W this was not Washington's exact mental attitude from start to finish -- clearly formulated at the beginning and never modified by special conditions later -- then his whole course of conduct and expression was purely accidental, a thing not to be believed of him. Again and again he was besought to leave the army at the North and take the command in Virginia; and uniformly he replied that he was resolved to continue at the North conformably with well-matured

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plans which, in their execution, would give Virginia far greater relief than his personal presence could possibly bring to pass. In July, when his enterprise against New York was in full progress, Richard Henry Lee wrote to him pressingly from Virginia, declaring that the people were ready to make him dictator if he would show himself there; to which he replied in the following strong words: " My present plan of operation, which I have been preparing with all the zeal and activity in my power, will, I am morally certain, with proper support, produce one of two things, either the fall of New

York or a withdrawal of the (enemy's) troops from Virginia.1' On the 4th of June, previously to the junction of the American and French armies in Westchester County, he wrote from his headquarters at New Windsor these most significant words to the Count de Eochambeau: " 1 could wish that the march of the [French] troops might now be hurried as much as possible. ... I know of no measure which will be so likely to afford relief to the Southern States." Yet it has been claimed by some historical writers that it was Washington's essential policy to capture New York, and That the idea of the final move to Virginia originated with Rochambeau.