York or a withdrawal of the (enemy's) troops from Virginia.1' On the 4th of June, previously to the junction of the American and French armies in Westchester County, he wrote from his headquarters at New Windsor these most significant words to the Count de Eochambeau: " 1 could wish that the march of the [French] troops might now be hurried as much as possible. ... I know of no measure which will be so likely to afford relief to the Southern States." Yet it has been claimed by some historical writers that it was Washington's essential policy to capture New York, and That the idea of the final move to Virginia originated with Rochambeau. This view rests upon the exceedingly slender foundation that at the Weathersfield conference Rochambeau opposed any cooperation b\ the licet at New York (because, as THF ROYAL france.7~G OF already pointed out, of French prejudice against the Sandy Hook bar). But if at Woathersliold Rochambeau conceived the Virginia campaign, it was certainly not a conception based upon the plan of a formidable preliminary New York campaign. Without the preliminary New York campaign, conducted with the utmost sagacity, there would have been no triumphant Virginia campaign. This digression from the straightforward progress of our narrative seems necessary to a proper understanding of the Weathersfield agreement of the 22d of May and its relations to subsequent events. That agreement was decidedly indefinite, except in the one particular that there should be an immediate movement of the combined armies on New