There is an abundance of proof that the reconnoissance of New n's part, and York was a perfectly sincere proceeding on Washingto that at the time he fully intended to follow it up with a regular siege in the case that the fleet of de Orasse should make its appearance in New York Bay. Moreover, he earnestly desired that de Orasse should come there. Previously to the junction of the armies at Dobbs Ferry he had written to de Orasse, urging him to steer a straight course for Sandv Hook; and on July 10, at a conference with Rochambeau. "Upon the whole, I do not see he expressed himself as follows: 1 Los Franrnis

ot Amoriquo

ppnrtnnt la Guerre do ^Independence <!<"-; fitats-Unis.

OPERATIONS

17S1

what more can bo done than to prosecute the plan agreed upon at the Weathersfield conference, and to recommend to the Count de Grasse to come immediately to Sandy Hook, and, if possible, possess the harbor of New York." But he remained in complete uncertainty as to de Grasse's intentions until the middle of August. He accordingly stayed in his Dobbs Ferry encampment awaiting intelligence. In this connection he adopted a measure to procure the speediest possible information of the arrival of the fleet if Sandy Hook should prove to be the destination of de Grasse. On July 21 -- the day when he set out to reconnoiter New York -- he addressed the following autograph letter (whose original is now in the possession of the editor of this History) to Brigadier-General David Forman1 at Monmouth X. J. : Head Quarters, Dobbs Ferry, 21st July, 1781. Dear Sir:-- When I request your particular Care of the enclosed, it is necessary that 1 should inform you in the fullest confidence, and under the strictest injunctions of seeresy, that the Count de Grasse may be shortly expected with his whole fleet from the West Indies.