Cornwallis, finding his position perilous in the interior of thai State, was retreating to Yorktown, with the intention of intrenching himself there. At this juncture, should de Grasse enter the Chesapeake instead of New York Harbor, Cornwallis would be .aught between the American fleet and the Southern American land forces, in which eventuality it would probecome highly expedient for Washington and Rochambeau to York New at Clinton meantime And n. Yorktow ceed quicklv 'to dared not send relief to Cornwallis, but was obliged to look to his own

safety. Thus the first part of Washington's plan, as conceived at Weathersfield, was already realized: by beginning a campaign on New York he had eased matters in Virginia. It remained to be seen whether the further changes in the situation would justify him in the actually besieging New York or summon him to Virginia befornews would thing ing determin The is. Cornwall of ion annihilat from the fleet. Washington's movements in Westchester County made such an impression on Sir Henry Clinton that the latter not only did not reenforce Cornwallis, but actually ordered troops to be sent to New York from the South. On July 2(5 he wrote to Cornwallis to have three regiments dispatched to New York from the Carol inas, saying: - 1 shall probably want them, as well as the troops \jou man be able to spare me from the Chesapeake, for such, offensive or defensive operations as may offer in this quarter." The order was countermanded after the coming of the 3,000 Hessians, but it shows how promptly the presence of the allied armies in our county bore fruit. Washington wrote to Lafayette on this point: " I think we have already effected one part of the plan of campaign settled at Weathersfield -- that is, giving a substantial relief to the Southern States by obliging the enemy to recall a considerable part of their force from them.