not learned the more modern military theory of "at- " trition," no matter at what cost, nor was he of the same school of politics as that in which Bute and Germaine and Dundas and Wedderburne and Jay and Duane and the Livingstons and the Morrises were preceptors, of high or low degree: on the other hand, he did not expose his command where the object to be attained was inadequate, 1 nor was he inclined to visit the country, even that portion of it which was antagonistic to the Royal Army, with severity. 2

Whatever may have inspired and encouraged him, notwithstanding all whichs he had previously said of the "innumerable difficulties in his way, " of turning him," [" the enemy, ,"] " on either side," and of his own, evidently well-considered, apprehensions of an unfavorable result, should an attempt be made to do so, General Howe determined to endeavor to turn the left flank of the American Army, encamped on the Heights of Harlem and in Westchester-county, with a view of compelling it to abandon its very strong position and, if possible, of bringing it to action. As the defensive works, on the high grounds to the southward of the Harlem plains, with the moderate detachment which he could leave, for the purpose of occupying them and the other portions of the City of New York, and with the further protection which was afforded by the Fleet and the increased safety which had been afforded by the capture of the American works at Powle's-hook, appeared to afford all the protection which would be neeessary, there seemed to have been little probability that General Washington would make any attempt to recover, or even to raid, that Oity ; and the determination of General Howe was, therefore, a reasonable one, and, with such a force and with such appointments as he, then, controlled, there was a reasonable probability that it would be attended with an entire success.