Lee saw the perilous situation in which he was likely to be placed, and acted with his accustomed promptness. He instantly broke up his en-campment and put his forces in motion toward the main army, at Whiteplains. The rough and hilly highway along which he marched, is generally known as the Tuckahoe road, and it was filled for the space of four miles by the two divisions under his command, eight thousand strong, with their artil-lery and baggage, including a train of a hundred and fifty wagons, laden with stores and ammunition. In ascending several of the hills on this road, he was obliged to halt and double the teams, in open view of the enemy, and at no con-siderable distance from them. They made no attempt, how-ever, to interfere with his dangerous retreat along their front. Had they done so, the total loss of his cannon and wagons could scarcely have been avoided. In this case he would

Chapter I

BEFORE THE BATTLE OF WHITEPLAINS 35

have moved his forces unencumbered, toward the Hudson, and then have united himself to the main army, by marching along the Sprain, or the Saw Mill River road. As it was, he spent the whole of a toilsome night in floundering along the Tuckahoe road; but arrived at Whiteplains, on Monday morning, in safety, with all his men and material.

A few days afterward, while a body of Continental troops lay at Northcastle, one of the American commanders, wish-ing to make use of a large quantity of corn stalks, made an arrangement with a Quaker farmer named William Carpenter, for all he could furnish from his corn then standing, and con-sisting of a field of twelve acres. To expedite the business, a detachment of military was ordered out, which cut down, husked, and carried up the whole crop into his granary.