One needs only to insj^ect the river, or even a good map of it, to be convinced that if a reasonable hope of controlling navigation from any point below the Highlands could be entertained, this was the place. The river between Forts Washington and Lee is narrow and is commanded upon both banks by high hills. But the stream is swift and deep, as well as narrow, and the task of obstructing it was by no means as light a one as at first glance it might appear. Then, too, the necessity of retaining possession of the shores in order to make the blockade effectual would demand the

presence of a large force. The whole of Washington's army was not too large for this work, yet it would have been manifesth' absurd to contemplate the retention of the army for such a purpose. It has been shown that the policy which led to an effort to hold this natural gateway after the retirement of the Americans from the city was strongly urged by Congress; nor must we forget, in criticising the military judgment of Washington, that an almost irresistible pressure was brought to bear upon him in this matter by the civil authorities as well as by the counsel of his own officers.

The security of the Hudson [says Irving], was at this time an object of great solicitude with Congress, and much reHance was placed on Putnam's obstructions at Fort Washington. Four galleys, mounted with heavy guns and swivels, were stationed