Westchester County is asking a judge to end the lawsuit challenging its license-plate surveillance network, arguing that the system falls within police powers and that the plaintiffs have not established a protected privacy interest. Its September 11 dismissal motion puts two questions before the court: how much vehicle tracking is constitutionally permissible, and who gets to authorize it. Read the motion notice. The case is Yukiko Ann Umemoto et al. v. Westchester County, New York et al., index 65935/2026, before Justice Walter Rivera in state Supreme Court in Westchester. Four lower Hudson Valley residents filed it June 9 against the county, its Department of Public Safety and two county police officials in their official capacities. Complaint. Croton has a direct stake because its police use the county network. At the Village Board’s August 19 presentation, Chief John Nikitopoulos and Detective Mark Fielding described Croton’s participation in the Real Time Crime Center. The complaint includes Croton among municipalities with connected readers. Neither the Village nor Rekor, the software company identified in the complaint, is a defendant. Complaint, pages 8–11; August presentation. The plaintiffs describe a system that combines cameras, a retained database and analytical software. Their complaint alleges at least 575 connected readers and more than 264 million vehicle recordings in 2024, with records generally retained for at least two years. Those figures describe the plaintiffs’ allegations, rather than a court finding or a newly verified inventory of today’s equipment. Complaint, pages 7–13. Their privacy argument concerns what those records reveal together. A searchable history can expose routines, political associations, worship or medical visits, they say. The complaint describes tools for identifying vehicles frequently seen near a place and vehicles that appear to travel together. The plaintiffs argue that collecting and analyzing such histories without meaningful safeguards violates the New York Constitution’s protection against unreasonable searches. Complaint, pages 16–18 and 36–37. The county sees a legally significant difference between those records and continuous tracking. Its brief argues that license plates and vehicles on public roads are openly visible. It says the complaint describes scattered snapshots with gaps, rather than the comprehensive location history associated with cellphone surveillance. The dispute is over what the accumulated information reveals; those competing arguments await the court’s decision. County memorandum, pages 17–18. The other two claims concern democratic control over policing technology. The plaintiffs say existing laws do not specifically authorize this scale of surveillance. Alternatively, they argue that reading those laws so broadly would leave police making policy choices that elected legislators must make. The county answers that its longstanding authority to investigate crime already includes buying cameras, maintaining databases and using software. It argues that operating this system implements an existing public-safety mandate. Complaint, pages 20–21 and 37–40; county memorandum, pages 25–29. Local police have explained why they value the readers. Fielding told trustees in August that they assist investigations including burglaries, hit-and-runs and missing-person cases. He also emphasized that a plate detection supplies an investigative lead and that identifying a vehicle does not by itself establish who was driving or justify an arrest. Those were police explanations of their work. Presentation and transcript, 18:21–20:53 and 25:40–27:46. The local record leaves outside-access questions open. January 15 Police Advisory Committee minutes described judicial warrants for outside jurisdictions seeking data, expressly including ICE and other agencies. In August, Fielding described federal agencies contacting county police with an active investigation, and governmental agencies requesting data with a case number. He also said he could not speak for county police and qualified his understanding of their process. His separate discussion of requesting Flock records concerned his own outgoing requests through other agencies. January minutes, page 2; August discussion, 39:23–44:01 and 57:21–58:02. These accounts do not establish that a formal warrant requirement was removed. The complaint itself acknowledges a general department policy limiting database use to law-enforcement purposes or authorized background investigations, while arguing that it is too vague. Determining the applicable access rules requires the actual county protocols and any dated changes. Complaint, paragraphs 54–55. The dismissal motion also raises questions that could end claims without resolving every privacy issue. The county argues that the constitutional claim required advance notice that the plaintiffs failed to provide. It challenges their legal standing to bring the two police-authority claims and says filing deadlines expired: four months for the agency-action challenge and six years for the challenge to the enabling law. Those are defenses awaiting a decision. County memorandum, pages 11 and 19–24. At the October 16 public docket review, the case was listed as active and no ruling on this dismissal motion was listed. The plaintiffs’ opposition is scheduled for October 26, giving them the next opportunity to answer the county’s arguments. The county’s reply is due November 25, followed by a December 2 return date. The corrected notice specifies written submissions unless the court directs otherwise; December 2 is not a promised decision date. Corrected notice, page 2. The plaintiffs seek class certification and orders stopping the system’s operation and public spending on it. These remain requests, not relief reported as granted. Croton News will track the opposition, reply and any schedule changes or decisions in the Legal Proceedings case record, preserving links to the filings and earlier coverage. Requested relief, pages 40–41.