It is true that, contrasted with the conditions which would have obtained if Howe had been in possession of the Hudson simultaneously with opening his campaign from the Sound, the situation created by his sudden descent on Throgg's Neck was not without an element of hope. At least, one flank of the American army remained quite unimperiled, which afforded scope for thwarting the designs of the enemy upon the other by the resources of defensive generalship. But aside from that single comforting aspect, the outlook was alarming in an extreme degree. Washington, intrenched on the Heights of Harlem -- that is, in the northwestern portion of .Manhattan Island, -- with New York City below him in the hands of the British, and Howe making ready to fall upon him on his flank, had but three possible courses of action -- first, to remain in that position and undergo a siege, which could have resulted in nothing but early capitulation, as he would have had no sources from which to draw supplies; second, to retreat at once across the Hudson River into New Jersey under the protection of Fort Washington and Fort Lee, a programme not to be thought of even if it could have been carried out successfully, since it would have involved abandoning the whole country northward, including the Highlands and consequently the river to its source; or third, to seek a new defensive position at the north, where he could fight the enemy under tolerably advantageous geographical conditions, backed by the Westchester hills and finally by the Highlands, with the King's Ferry Of these three possible route to New Jersey and Philadelphia open. courses, one was equivalent to ruin and another to disgrace, while the third and only feasible one was hedged about by a variety of In the first place, strangely doubtful and difficult circumstances. for unpreparedness of disadvantage every under was Washington He was even unprepared in judgment, so unexsuch a movement. pectedly did the necessity of considering the matter present itself.